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Identifying Earnings Management: The Case of Small-Cap Corporations in 
the United States 
 
Cecilia Wagner Ricci, PhD  Susan O’Sullivan Gavin, J.D. 
 
Abstract  
The purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics of large cap companies that have 
been sanctioned by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for 
earnings management, and to test those characteristics on small cap companies to determine 
whether they can be used to detect earnings management in the small cap space.  Thirteen 
non-accrual financial characteristics identified by previous researchers are tested, including 
both financial ratios and account levels.  Univariate and multivariate analysis are used in the 
determination of the applicability of large company indicators of earnings management to 
small cap companies. 
 
I. Introduction 
The catalyst for the study is extant research that indicates that earnings management occurs 
more often in small companies than in larger companies (Ajina et al., 2016, Hoang, 2007; 
Beasley et al., 1999; Feroz et al., 1991; Persons, 1995; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986; 
Kinney and McDaniel, 1989), yet there is little research on earnings management in small cap 
companies.  This study is intended to fill this gap, and thus should be of interest to a variety 
of entities, including regulators, academics, and practitioners. 
 
The next section presents background information on SEC sanctions.  This is followed by a 
review of the relevant literature.  The subsequent sections discuss the sample, the 
methodology, and results of the empirical tests.  The final section presents the conclusions, 
the limitations of the study, and suggestions for areas of future research.  
 
II. SEC Sanctions  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeks various remedies and sanctions, 
including equitable and administrative, for earnings management conduct in violation of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Both individuals and 
companies can be found liable for violations of the securities acts. The equitable remedy is an 
injunction to prohibit future illegal conduct. Violation of such an injunction could result in 
additional monetary penalties and imprisonment for contempt. In addition, the SEC may also 
seek monetary penalties/fines, and disgorgement of illegal profits. Administrative remedies 
and sanctions include cease and desist orders, orders for accountings and disgorgement of 
illegal profits, restatements of earnings, prohibitions from serving as officers and directors, 
and monetary penalties per the Acts (About the Division of Enforcement).  The SEC also has 
the discretion to enter into agreements that influence the severity of statutory sanctions, 
including cooperation agreements, deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution 
agreements. (SEC Enforcement Manual).  It is also within the power of the SEC to consult 
with, informally refer matters to, and work cooperatively with federal (Department of Justice) 
and state enforcement authorities (in any parallel civil and criminal investigations), the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), federal banking agencies pursuant to the 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, and state professional licensing and association boards (About the 
Division of Enforcement). 
 
III. Identification of Financial Variables 
The identification of the financial variables tested in this study is based upon a review of the 
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relevant literature, which is the focus of this section.  Previous research suggests that there 
are several ways in which companies engaging in earnings management differ from 
companies not engaging in earnings management.  Many studies have found that companies 
engaging in earnings management have higher levels of receivables, inventory and long-term 
debt than companies not engaging in earnings management.  For example, Dalnial et al. 
(2014) study publicly listed firms in Malaysia and find that the total debt/total assets, total 
debt/total equity, inventory/total assets, and receivables/sales ratios are statistically 
significantly different for fraud and non-fraud companies.  In addition, they find that these 
ratios tend to be higher for firms with fraudulent financial statements.  In their study of 
companies in Lithuania, Kanapickiene and Grundiene (2015) report that the inventory/sales, 
long-term debt/equity, long-term debt/total assets, receivables/sales, receivables/total assets, 
and total liabilities/total assets ratios are significantly different. Kaminski et al. (2004) use a 
matched sample of 79 companies to evaluate the usefulness of 21 financial ratios.  They find 
that in the years preceding what they term “the fraud year,” interest expense/total liabilities, 
sales/accounts receivable, cost of goods sold/sales, and accounts receivable/total assets are 
significantly dissimilar for the two types of companies.  Persons (1995) studies the usefulness 
of financial statement data as predictors of accounting fraud.  She identifies companies’ 
involvements in fraudulent financial reporting via SEC data, and matches them with non-
fraudulent companies.  Using stepwise logistic models, she concludes that total 
liabilities/total assets, receivables/total assets, and inventory/total assets tend to be higher for 
sanctioned firms as opposed to non-sanctioned firms, and that these differences are 
statistically significant.  Using an Artificial Neural Network to assist in identifying a model 
for uncovering fraud based on financial statements, Fanning and Cogger (1998) use a set of 
102 pairs of companies, matching companies identified by the SEC as having committed 
fraud with non-fraud companies.  They conclude that the accounts receivable/sales, 
inventory/sales, and long-term debt/shareholders’ equity are statistically significant (α = 0.01) 
and tend to be elevated for sanctioned companies.  
 
There are also several studies dealing with two of the variables.  For example, Dichev et al. 
(2013) identify large inventory build-ups, and increasing or high debt as red flags.  In her 
study of earnings manipulation in failing firms, Rosner (2003) reports that such firms have 
significant increases in accounts receivable, inventory, and sales, and significant decreases in 
operating cash flows.  Beasley et al. (1999) find that companies committing financial 
reporting fraud tend to do so by overstating revenues, accounts receivable, and inventory.  
Moore (2007) tests combinations of significant variables in order to create a predictive 
model.  She finds that inventory/sales and accounts receivable are statistically significantly 
higher in sanctioned companies as compared to non-sanctioned companies.  Feroz et al. 
(1991) report that most of the AAERs issued by the SEC involve receivables and inventory 
overstatements.  In research concerning earnings management, Roy chowdhury (2006) 
reports that it is tied to the levels of inventory and receivables. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (2003) 
reports that in the expense recognition area, corporations overstate ending inventory and 
accounts receivable.  Summers and Sweeney (1998) utilize a sample of fifty-one firms that 
committed fraud between 1981 and 1987 identified via the Wall Street Journal Index 
(matched with firms that had not committed fraud).  They report that the inventory/sales ratio 
is statistically significant in the year preceding the fraud year and that it is higher for 
sanctioned companies.  In their research on detecting fraud, Lendez and Korevec (1999) find 
that the overstatement of assets via reserve accounts for inventory and receivables is a 
common method of earnings management. 
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There is also research related to one of the three areas.  For example, Beneish (1999) utilizes 
a sample of 74 companies that were issued AAERs between 1987 and 1993 to identify 
variables that detect earnings manipulation, and finds that the receivables/sales ratio is 
statistically significant.   Ricci and Gavin (2014) find inventory manipulating companies tend 
to have higher inventory than non-inventory manipulating companies. In their study of firms 
that have been sanctioned by the SEC, DeChow et al. (2011) conclude that firms 
manipulating earnings have higher levels of external financing.  Castro and Martinez (2009) 
find that companies who engage in income smoothing tend to have higher long-term debt. 
 Moreira and Pope (2007) find that the likelihood of earnings management increases as debt 
increases.   In their study of earnings management prior to issuing bonds, Yixin et al. (2010) 
report that firms engage in earnings management with the goal of decreasing their cost of 
debt.  Using logistic regression, Suyanto (2009) finds that the inventory/total assets ratio is 
significantly different in fraudulent financial statements compared to non-fraudulent financial 
statements. Concerns about levels of debt may also be seen in the research on earnings 
management as it relates to violating debt covenants.  For example, Hettihewa and Wright 
(2010) report that in the earnings management arena, managers are likely to make decisions 
that avoid defaulting on debt covenants.  Jha (2013) finds that upward earnings management 
occurs prior to debt covenant violations.  Franz et al. (2013) find that firms that are close to 
breaching debt covenants are more likely to engage in earnings management than firms that 
are not. 
 
Based on the literature review, thirteen variables were identified.  Each category of variable - 
those relating to inventory, receivables, or debt - includes several measurements, as follows:   
Accounts Receivable: 
Gross Receivablesi 
Receivables/Sales 
Receivables/Total Assets 
Inventory: 
Inventory 
Inventory/Sales 
Inventory/Total Assets 
Debt: 
Long-term debt 
Long-term debt/common equity 
Long-term debt/total assets 
Total liabilities 
Total liabilities/total assets 
Overall: 
Sales 
Total assets 
 
IV. Sample 
The sample consists of thirty-one small cap companies that had been sanctioned by the SEC 
matched by market cap in the year preceding the beginning of the earnings management as 
stated by the SEC, and GIC Economic Sector.  Three years of data were available for each 
company for total of 186 firm-years. The sanctioned companies and their matches may be 
seen in Appendix A 
 
V. Descriptives 
The sample classified by GIC Economic Sector may be seen in Table 1.  GIC Sectors 55 
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Utilities and 50 Telecommunication Services were not represented in the sample.  In addition, 
GIC 40 Financials was excluded from the sample because companies in this sector do not 
have all of the variables necessary for inclusion in the study.  While a larger sample would be 
ideal, the universe of small cap companies identified as engaging in earnings management 
and sanctioned by the SEC for earnings management is relatively small.  Certainly, one 
expects that there are companies that have been engaging in earnings management that have 
not been identified, as well as companies engaging in earnings management who are still at 
the investigation level and thus unidentified for researchers. 
 
As indicated, the sample is weighted with companies in the Industrials (GIC 20), Information 
Technology (GIC 45), Healthcare (GIC 35), and Consumer Discretionary (GIC 25) sectors.  
This mirrors, to some extent, the distribution of the Russell Microcap Index, which is heavily 
weighted with companies in the Financial Services, Health Care, Technology, and Consumer 
Discretionary sectors.  These sector clusters are also comparable to Beasley et al. (1999), 
who found that sanctioned companies tend to be in the computer hardware and software, 
other manufacturing, and health care industries.  The presence of companies in the IT and 
Consumer sectors are similar to that of the Deloitte Forensic Center (2009), which reported 
both to be prominent sectors in terms of earnings management.  However, Deloitte also found 
a high number of telecommunications companies (Deloitte Forensic Center, 2009), as did 
DeChow et al. (2011), while in the current study, Telecommunications Services (GIC 50) is 
not represented. 
 
Table 2 presents the number of cases on a calendar basis.  32.3 per cent of the sample began 
the sanctioned behavior between 2006 and 2008.  This is followed by 22.6 per cent of the 
sample in between 2009 and 2011.  Over half of the cases occurred between 2006 and 2011.   
Table 3 contains the descriptives (means, medians, and standard deviations) of each type of 
company.  Companies engaging in earnings management have higher average 
receivables/sales, inventory/total assets, long-term debt/total assets, and total liabilities/total 
assets than non-earnings management companies.  Moreover, such companies have higher 
median inventory and long-term debt. 
 
VI. Results 
This section contains the results of the analysis.  First, paired sample t-tests are used to 
identify significant differences.  Tests are run on the entire sample, the sample classified by 
GIC Economic Sectors, and annually for the three years prior to the year in which the SEC 
reports that the earnings management began (Years -1, -2 and -3). 
 
VI.1 Paired Sample T-Tests 
The first analysis examines the variables’ differences by using the matched sample and the t-
test. Table 4 contains the results of the t-tests on the entire sample.  As indicated, seven of 
thirteen variables are statistically significant: three debt-related, one receivables-related, one 
inventory-related, sales, and total assets.  The significance of three of five of the debt ratios 
suggests that debt may play a role in earnings management. 
 
Table 5 contains the paired sample t-tests results by GIC Economic Sector.  The differences 
among sectors are striking.  For example, in GIC 25 Consumer Discretionary, twelve of 
thirteen variables are statistically significant, while in GIC 20 Industrials, only two are 
significant.  In GIC 25, the only variable that is not significant is inventory/sales.  In GIC 35 
Health Care, three variables are not significant, one receivables related, one inventory related 
and one debt related. These results are similar to those of Beasley et al. (1999).  The only 
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variable that is significant across all sectors is receivables; the only variable that is not 
significant in any sector is inventory/sales.  These results suggest that detecting earnings 
management may be more effective when done on a sectoral basis, rather than using a “one 
size fits all” detection method. 
 
Table 6 shows the variables’ ability to predict earnings management in one, two, and three 
years (Years -1, -2, and -3, respectively) prior to the year the SEC reports that the earnings 
management began.  Seven of thirteen variables are statistically significant in Year -3, 
including all of the debt-related ratios and account levels.  Total assets and total liabilities 
were significant in Years -2 and -3.  None of the inventory variables was statistically 
significant, and only one receivables-related ratio was significant in Year -2.  None of the 
variables are statistically significant in Year -1. 
 
The fact that statistically significant differences were detected in Year -3, but for most of the 
variables, not in Years -1 and -2 is confounding.  Nevertheless, the results for the debt-related 
variables support much of the previous research. One interesting result was that the 
inventory/sales ratio is not statistically significant in the overall tests, the tests by GIC sector 
or the tests by the years preceding the earnings management.  This is in contrast to the 
research completed by Fanning and Cogger (1998), Moore (2007), and Summers and 
Sweeney (1998).  Also of interest is that the inventory/total assets and receivables/total assets 
ratios are significant in only two of the tests.  While the receivables-related results may be 
suspect due to the use of gross receivables and not net, the inventory results may be due to 
the fact that some of the inventory manipulation is via the cost of sales which does not appear 
directly in this study. 
 
VI.2 Discriminant Analysis 
The large number of independent variables warrants multivariate analysis, and accordingly, 
discriminant analysis was conducted using earnings management as the criterion variable.  
The predictor variables are the independent variables used in the univariate analysis. The 
discriminant analysis is completed using principal component analysis with varimax rotation.  
The analysis is conducted on overall sample, the sample by GIC Economic Sector, and by the 
years preceding the earnings management (Years -1 to -3), and the results are presented in 
this manner.  
 
VI.3 Total Sample 
The overall Wilks’ lambda is significant (p = 0.0056), indicating that discriminant analysis is 
merited.  The canonical correlation was 0.49.  The standardized canonical discriminant 
function coefficients may be seen in Table 7.  The variables with the largest coefficients are 
total assets, inventory/sales, receivables/sales, and inventory.  The classification table for this 
function, seen in Table 8, shows that 69.3 per cent of the companies were classified correctly, 
and that this drops to 64.0 per cent in the cross-validation. 
 
VI.4 Sample by GIC Economic Sector 
Discriminant analysis was also done by GIC Economic Sector for the categories with the 
highest number of firm-years, including GIC 20 Industrials (48 firm-years), GIC 45 
Information Technology (42 firm-years), GIC 35 Healthcare (34 firm-years), and GIC 25 
Consumer Discretionary (34 firm-years).  Table 9 contains the Wilks Lambdas and levels of 
significance for the sample categorized by GIC Economic Sector.  As indicated, all are 
statistically significant, and discriminant analysis was undertaken.  Table 10 contains the 
standardized canonical correlation coefficients used to create the respective discriminant 
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functions for the GIC Economic Sectors.  The variables excluded, indicated by EXC in the 
table, failed the tolerance tests.  Table 11 contains the classification results of the 
discriminant analysis by GIC Economic Sector.  Again, the results vary by sector.  The 
percentage of cases classified correctly in GICs 20 and 25 were 92.3 per cent and 100 per 
cent, respectively.  The cross-validation results were the same.  In GIC 35 Health Care, the 
percentage correct is 86.7, which drops to 60.0 per cent in the cross-validation.  The 
percentage classified correctly in GIC 45 Information Technology is 79.2 per cent, which 
drops to 75 per cent in the cross-validation. 
 
The next step was to examine the impacts of dividing the sample by Year (Year -1, Year -2, 
and Year -3).  Table 12 shows the Wilks’ Lambdas and significance for each year in the three 
years preceding the earnings management.  As indicated, none of the results were statistically 
significant.  Consequently, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and thus there is no basis 
for additional analysis. 
 
VII. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
The research question posed at the beginning of this study is: can the variables used to 
identify earnings management in large cap companies be used for the same purpose for small 
cap companies?  The overwhelming conclusion of this study is that the “one size fits all” 
approach to detecting earnings management is not appropriate.  Both the univariate and 
multivariate analyses indicate that the detection of earnings management on a sector by sector 
basis is necessary. 
 
These results provide several areas for future research.  For example, twelve of thirteen 
variables show statistically significant differences between the two types of companies in the 
Consumer Discretionary sector (GIC 25), yet in the Industrials sector (GIC 20), only two of 
thirteen variables are statistically significant.  Clearly, additional research must identify the 
variables that can be used to detect earnings management in the Industrials sector.  In 
addition, only six of thirteen variables in the Information Technology sector were statistically 
significant, which provides an additional area for future research.  
 
Future research may also investigate the reasons for the results concerning the three years 
preceding the start of the earnings management.  Why would there be no statistically 
significant differences in the year directly preceding the one in which the SEC says the 
sanctioned behaviour began, and a large number of differences three years prior to the year in 
which the sanctioned behaviour began? 
 
Regarding limitations to this study, the major one is the sample size.  Unfortunately, the 
number of small cap companies that have been sanctioned by the SEC for earnings 
management is small, and there is no action that can be taken to increase the sample size 
other than the reporting of SEC sanctions.  While this is of concern, it does not obviate the 
need for additional research concerning earnings management in small-cap companies. 
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Appendix A. Sample Companies 
Sanctioned Company Matching Company 
Apogee Technology Inc Span-America Medical Sys Inc 
Black Box Corp Superconductor Technologies 
Canadian Solar Inc Calamp Corp 
China Valves Technology Inc Northwest Pipe Co 
Comverse Technology Inc Ati Technologies Inc 
DGSE Companies Inc Jaclyn Inc 
DGSE Companies Inc Ttc Technology Corp 
Diamond Foods Inc Coca-Cola Bottling 
Eco2 Plastics Inc Web Press Corp 
Fuqi International Inc Finishmaster Inc 
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Corp Hawaiian Holdings Inc 
Hain Celestial Group Inc Worthington Foods Inc 
Hansen Medical Inc Align Technology Inc 
Huron Consulting Group Inc Forward Air Corp 
JDA Software Group Inc Triquint Semiconductor Inc 
LSB Industries Inc Synalloy Corp 
Medquist Inc Allegiant Physician Services 
Merge Healthcare Inc Millennium Healthcare Inc 
Miller Energy Resources Inc Stratic Energy Corp 
Ocata Therapeutics Inc Taro Pharmaceutical Industries 
Saba Software Inc Ceragon Networks Ltd 
Stein Mart Inc Dillards Inc  
Symbol Technologies Mentor Graphics Corp 
Symmetry Medical Inc US Oncology Inc 
Terex Corp Layne Christensen Co 
United Industrial Corp Spar Aerospace Ltd 
Universal Travel Group Silverleaf Resorts Inc 
Verifone Systems Inc Wyndstorm Corp 
Volt Info Sciences Inc G&K Services Inc  
West Marine Inc Friedmans Inc  
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Table 1. Sample Distribution by GIC Economic Sector 
GIC Frequency Percent 
10 Energy 1 3.2% 
15 Materials 1 3.2% 
20 Industrials 8 25.8% 
25 Consumer Discretionary 6 19.4% 
30 Consumer Staples 2 6.5% 
35 Health Care 6 19.4% 
45 Information Technology 7 22.6% 
 
Table 2. Sample Distribution by Year 
Period Frequency Percent 
1997 - 1999 5 16.1% 
2000 - 2002 5 16.1% 
2003 - 2005 3 12.9% 
2006 - 2008 10 32.3% 
2009 - 2011 6 22.6% 
 
Table 3. Descriptive by Type 
 Type 1: Sanctioned Firms Type 2: Matching Firms 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
RECEIVABLES 
Receivables 75.32 31.84  98.46 87.53  38.44  115.01 
Receivables/sales  0.41   0.19   2.13   0.24   0.16   0.27  
Receivables/total assets  0.19   0.18   0.14   0.22   0.18   0.16  
INVENTORY 
Inventory 73.00 26.94  116.25 124.51 18.28  283.80 
Inventory/sales 0.16 0.12 0.37 0.18 0.14 0.29 
Inventory/total assets  0.16   0.11   0.18   0.14   0.12   0.12  
DEBT 
Long-term debt 101.99 10.72  173.88 175.86  3.88  256.76 
Long-term debt/common equity 0.37  0.04  1.95 1.16  0.12  2.72 
Long-term debt/total assets  0.18   0.08   0.23   0.16   0.11   0.20  
Total liabilities 213.01  75.01  282.20 407.29  85.74  569.46 
Total liabilities/total assets  0.83   0.46   1.90   0.58   0.48   0.57  
OTHER 
Sales 449.84 215.82  494.20 803.93  236.82  1,398.82 
Total assets 371.24 194.85  369.94 680.43  250.92  998.17 
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Table 4. Paired Sample t-Test Results, Overall Sample 
  t Sig 
RECEIVABLES 
Receivables -1.09 (0.1383) 
Receivables/sales 0.763 (0.2238) 
Receivables/total assets -1.468 (0.0728)* 
INVENTORY 
Inventory -1.330 (0.0929)* 
Inventory/sales -0.787 (0.2168) 
Inventory/total assets 1.036 (0.1515) 
DEBT 
Long-term debt -1.66 (0.0502)* 
Long-term debt/common equity -1.72 (0.0442)* 
Long-term debt/total assets 0.548 (0.2926) 
Total liabilities -2.47 (0.0077)** 
Total liabilities/total assets 1.239 (0.1093) 
OTHER 
Sales -2.07 (0.0206)* 
Total assets -2.38 (0.0098)** 
*** significant at 0.001 ** significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.10 
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Table 5. Paired Sample t-test Results by GIC Economic Sector. 
  20 
Industrials 
25 
Consumer  
Discretionary 
35 
Health Care 
45 
Information  
Technology 
  t sig t sig t sig t sig 
RECEIVABLES 
Receivables 1.76 (0.0455)* -3.32 (0.0020)*** -2.28 (0.0177)* 3.12 (0.0027)** 
Receivables/sales 0.99 (0.1674) -2.77 (0.0066)** 1.49 (0.0779)* 1.33 (0.0991)* 
Receivables/total assets 1.20 (0.1215) -3.74 (0.0008)*** -0.97 (0.1732) 0.22 (0.4158) 
INVENTORY 
Inventory 1.03 (0.1562) -2.14 (0.0237)* -1.71 (0.0526)* 1.27 (0.1094) 
Inventory/sales 0.13 (0.4503) -0.70 (0.2460) -0.13 (0.4499) -0.78 (0.2231) 
Inventory/total assets 0.14 (0.4469) 2.44 (0.0129)* -1.44 (0.0858)* -0.63 (0.2684) 
DEBT 
Long-term debt 0.87 (0.1961) -2.93 (0.0047)** -1.42 (0.0871)* 3.09 (0.0029)** 
 Long-term debt/common 
equity 
1.30 (0.1025) -1.98 (0.0322)* -1.41 (0.0883)* -0.13 (0.4489) 
Long-term debt/total assets 1.58 (0.0637)* -1.41 (0.0885)* 0.38 (0.3540) 1.20 (0.1214) 
Total liabilities 0.39 (0.3514) -3.11 (0.0032)*** -2.15 (0.0231)* 3.94 (0.0004)*** 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.24 (0.4045) -3.99 (0.0005)*** 1.51 (0.0758)* 0.57 (0.2861) 
OTHER 
Sales 0.60 (0.2785) -2.16 (0.0226)* -2.40 (0.0140)* 2.14 (0.0226)* 
Total assets 0.23 (0.4112) -2.49 (0.0118)* -2.53 (0.0108)* 3.54 (0.0010)*** 
*** significant at 0.001     ** significant at 0.01     * significant at 0.10 
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Table 6. Paired Sample t-test Results by Year. 
 
Year -1 Year -2 Year -3 
  
t (sig) t (sig) t (sig) 
RECEIVABLES 
Receivables -0.35 (0.3634) -0.65 (0.2588) -0.93 (0.1809) 
Receivables/sales 0.92 (0.1832) -1.63 (0.0572)* 0.06 (0.4762) 
Receivables/total assets -0.66 (0.2587) -1.29 (0.1031) -0.63 (0.2662) 
INVENTORY 
Inventory -0.44 (0.3333) -0.75 (0.2301) -1.17 (0.1259) 
Inventory/sales -0.10 (0.4623) -0.77 (0.2252) -0.73 (0.2354) 
Inventory/total assets 0.27 (0.3935) 0.95 (0.1748) 0.61 (0.2730) 
DEBT 
Long-term debt -0.53 (0.2988) -0.99 (0.1658) -1.54 (0.0667)* 
Long-term debt/common equity -0.81 (0.2128) -0.71 (0.2403) -1.41 (0.0838)* 
Long-term debt/total assets -0.57 (0.2865) -0.16 (0.4380) 1.33 (0.0964)* 
Total liabilities -1.05 (0.1499) -1.48 (0.0740)* -1.84 (0.0379)* 
Total liabilities/total assets -1.13 (0.1333) 0.83 (0.2076) 1.41 (0.0847)* 
OTHER 
Sales -0.88 (0.1921) -1.21 (0.1176) -1.51 (0.0711)* 
Total assets -0.83 (0.2076) -1.47 (0.0766)* -1.86 (0.0362)* 
*** significant at 0.001     ** significant at 0.01     * significant at 0.10 
 
  
International Research Journal of Applied Finance      ISSN 2229 – 6891 
Vol. VIII  Issue – 4  April, 2017                                            www.irjaf.com 
227 
 
 
Table 7. Std. Canonical Coefficients, Total Sample. 
  Function 1 
RECEIVABLES 
Receivables -0.97 
Receivables/sales -1.80 
Receivables/total assets 1.12 
INVENTORY 
Inventory -1.70 
Inventory/sales 2.15 
Inventory/total assets -0.13 
DEBT 
Long-term debt -1.46 
Long-term debt/common equity 0.39 
Long-term debt/total assets 0.30 
Total liabilities 1.75 
Total liabilities/total assets -0.67 
OTHER 
Sales -1.22 
Total assets 3.19 
 
Table 8. Discriminant Analysis, Overall Sample. 
  
Predicted Group Membership 
 
 
Type 1 2 Total 
Original 
1 42 (75.0%) 14 (25.0%) 56 
2 21 (36.2%) 37 (63.8%) 58 
Cross-validated 
1 38 (67.9%) 18 (32.1%) 56 
2 26 (44.8%) 32 (55.2%) 58 
 
Table 9. Wilks’ Lambda and Significance by GIC. 
GIC Wilks' Lambda Chi-square df Sig. 
20 Industrials 1 0.15 37.965 12 (.0002) 
25 Consumer Discretionary 1 0.11 41.504 10 (.0000) 
35 Healthcare 1 0.02 24.255 13 (.0289) 
45 Information Technology 1 0.23 22.875 13 (.0432) 
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Table 10. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients by GIC 
  
20 
Industrials 
25 
Consumer  
Discretionary 
35 
Health Care 
45 
Information  
Technology 
RECEIVABLES 
Receivables 0.175 -0.404 -0.135 0.611 
Receivables/sales 0.331 -1.345 -0.769 1.233 
Receivables/total assets -1.215 1.022 1.222 -2.098 
INVENTORY 
Inventory -0.358 5.197 3.751 -1.306 
Inventory/sales  EXC  EXC 1.628 -0.991 
Inventory/total assets 1.335 1.064 -0.754 2.220 
DEBT 
Long-term debt -1.912 -4.222 0.617 -3.430 
Long-term debt/common equity 1.494 0.222 -2.753 0.663 
Long-term debt/total assets -4.420 2.156 -1.090 8.014 
Total liabilities EXC   EXC 8.104 2.502 
Total liabilities/total assets 2.281 -0.546 0.671 -5.951 
OTHER 
Sales -2.478 -1.253 5.523 1.821 
Total assets 7.355 EXC  -7.017 -0.575 
 
Table 11. Discriminant Analysis by GIC Economic Sector. 
GIC 20 Industrials 
  
Predicted Group Membership 
 
 
Type 1 2 Total 
Original 
1 12 (92.3%) 1 (7.7%) 13 
2 0 (0.0%) 15 (100.0%) 15 
Cross-validated 
1 12 (92.3%) 1 (7.7%) 13 
2 0 (0.0%) 15 (100.0%) 15 
GIC 25 Consumer Discretionary 
  
Predicted Group Membership 
 
 
Type 1 2 Total 
Original 
1 9 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 9 
2 0 (0.0%) 17 (100.0%) 17 
Cross-validated 
1 9 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 9 
2 0 (0.0%) 17 (100.0%) 17 
GIC 35 Health Care 
  
Predicted Group Membership 
 
 
Type 1 2 Total 
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Original 
1 8 (88.9%) 1 (11.1%) 9 
2 1 (16.7%) 5 (83.3%) 6 
Cross-validated 
1 5 (55.6%) 4 (44.4%) 9 
2 2 (33.3%) 4 (66.7%) 6 
GIC 45 Information Technology 
  
Predicted Group Membership 
 
 
Type 1 2 Total 
Original 
1 13 (92.9%) 1 (7.1%) 14 
2 4 (40.0%) 6 (60.0%) 10 
Cross-validated 
1 12 (85.7%) 2 (14.3%) 14 
2 4 (40.0%) 6 (60.0%) 10 
 
Table 12. Wilks' Lambda and Significance by Year 
  Wilks' Lambda Chi-square df Sig. 
Year -1 1 0.879 4.462 7 (0.7252) 
Year -2 1 0.808 6.943 7 (0.4349) 
Year -3 1 0.753 8.644 7 (0.2792) 
 
 
                                                      
i
 Many small-cap companies do not report their allowances for doubtful accounts.  Consequently, the authors 
used gross receivables rather than net receivables in this study. 
